We visit the role of privatization in the location decision of firms in an industry where no firm can produce all varieties demanded. We demonstrate that the Nash equilibrium locations are socially optimal, in the presence of a publicly owned firm, notwithstanding the degree of privatization.

This paper examines the welfare implication of banning price discrimination in the intermediate goods market in which a monopolistic supplier contracts with asymmetric downstream retailers. We demonstrate that the supplier has a strong incentive to manipulate the interdependent demand structure...

This paper analyzes the unilateral choices of application compatibility by platforms and the endogenous affiliations of two different groups (content providers and users). We find a novel result that for both platforms to unilaterally choose application compatibility is not an equilibrium unless...

Payment networks typically differentiate interchange fees across different merchant sectors. This paper shows that it is generally efficient for a regulator to leave the decision on the structure of interchange fees to payment networks.

Laitinen (1980) derives an input allocation model for a multiproduct firm that first maximizes revenue and second maximizes profit. While theoretically elegant, the model has never been formulated empirically because of the complexity of the model’s price-deflated terms. This paper derives the...

We examine retailer heterogeneity in price adjustment in UK supermarkets. Considerable variation in the price change frequency of identically bar-coded products among retail chains is found. Decomposition analysis suggests that price adjustment is evenly split between sales and reference prices...

This paper studies the impact of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on the equilibrium locations in a Hotelling model with quadratic transportation cost. It is shown that equilibrium location varies from maximum differentiation to minimum differentiation, depending upon the relative strength...

Random choices of prices and product characteristics can be used by a contestable monopolist to deter entry and fully extract the monopoly rent. We develop this idea in a model of Bertrand price competition. In equilibrium, one firm enters the market and makes choices that are unpredictable to...

Myopic consumers underestimate the likelihood with which they will require follow-on services for products they purchase. Firms have an incentive to exploit this behavioral bias by skewing their price structure toward high add-on charges. Inadvertently, this skewed price structure provides...

This paper investigates the size of penalties required to deter cartel formation. Allowing the penalty to be increasing in duration within the infinitely repeated game framework, penalties do not need to be as severe as previous research would suggest.