Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 117
Cover Image
Overconfidence as a social bias: Experimental evidence
Proeger, Till; Meub, Lukas - In: Economics Letters 122 (2014) 2, pp. 203-207
The overconfidence bias is discussed extensively in economic studies, yet fails to hold experimentally once monetary … incentives and feedback are implemented. We consider overconfidence as a social bias. For a simple real effort task, we show that …, individually, economic conditions effectively prevent overconfidence. By contrast, the introduction of a very basic, purely …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743706
Cover Image
On the impulse in impulse learning
Ding, Jieyao; Nicklisch, Andreas - In: Economics Letters 121 (2013) 2, pp. 294-297
This paper experimentally investigates the nature of impulses in impulse learning. Particularly, we analyze whether positive feedback (i.e., yielding a superior payoff in a game) or negative feedback (i.e., yielding an inferior payoff in a game) leads to a systematic change in the individual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010709094
Cover Image
Evolutionary justifications for non-Bayesian beliefs
Zhang, Hanzhe - In: Economics Letters 121 (2013) 2, pp. 198-201
This paper suggests that the evolutionarily optimal belief of an agent’s intrinsic reproductive ability is systematically different from the posterior belief obtained by the perfect Bayesian updating. In particular, the optimal belief depends on how risk-averse the agent is. Although the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010709098
Cover Image
Validating an Ultra-Short Survey Measure of Patience
Vischer, Thomas; Dohmen, Thomas; Falk, Armin; Huffman, David - In: Economics Letters 120 (2013) 2, pp. 142-145
Abstract This study presents results of the validation of an ultra-short survey measure of patience included in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Survey responses predict intertemporal choice behavior in incentive-compatible decisions in a representative sample of the German adult population.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010322745
Cover Image
Smug Alert! Exploring self-licensing behavior in a cheating game
Clot, Sophie; Grolleau, Gilles; Ibanez, Lisette - In: Economics Letters 123 (2014) 2, pp. 191-194
We test experimentally a prediction of the ‘moral credit model’, in which committing a virtuous act creates moral credits that can license immoral behavior in a succeeding decision. We use a basic cheating experiment that was either preceded by a virtuous deed or not in a developing country...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906380
Cover Image
Do previous good deeds to a third party make people more tolerant of bad deeds against them? An experimental investigation
Ndodjang, P.; Grolleau, G.; Ibanez, L. - In: Economics Letters 121 (2013) 3, pp. 364-368
How do people react to a mix of good deeds to a third party and bad deeds against them? A modified ultimatum game shows that previous good deeds make responders substantially more tolerant to unfair proposals.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729450
Cover Image
Third party assessments in trust problems with conflict of interest: An experiment on the effects of promises
Kataria, Mitesh; Winter, Fabian - In: Economics Letters 120 (2013) 1, pp. 53-56
Is it possible to elicit reliable assessment from an assessor having a conflict of interest (e.g. a professor that writes a recommendation letter for a formal PhD student)? We propose an experimental test and show that compared to a not-incentivized assessment, a promise to give a truthful...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665695
Cover Image
The Troika paradox
Blavatskyy, Pavlo R. - In: Economics Letters 115 (2012) 2, pp. 236-239
In three binary choice problems, people reveal a choice pattern which falsifies expected utility theory and many generalized non-expected utility theories. This new paradox challenges popular non-expected utility models analogously to how the Allais paradox challenged neoclassical expected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572232
Cover Image
Risk attitudes and the stag-hunt game
Büyükboyacı, Mürüvvet - In: Economics Letters 124 (2014) 3, pp. 323-325
A stag-hunt game (with the risky and safe actions) has two pure Nash equilibria that are Pareto-rankable. The risky action leads either to the Pareto-superior equilibrium (high payoff) or to out of equilibrium (low payoff) depending on the opponent’s action. Both players may want to obtain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041643
Cover Image
Validating an ultra-short survey measure of patience
Vischer, Thomas; Dohmen, Thomas; Falk, Armin; Huffman, David - In: Economics Letters 120 (2013) 2, pp. 142-145
This study presents results of the validation of an ultra-short survey measure of patience included in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Survey responses predict intertemporal choice behavior in incentive-compatible decisions in a representative sample of the German adult population.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041744