In social choice settings with linear preferences, random dictatorship is known to be the only social decision scheme satisfying strategyproofness and ex post efficiency. When also allowing indifferences, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a well-known generalization of random dictatorship that...

Monetary incentives in online experiments are not always easy to implement. Yet online experiments are advantageous in terms of a natural decision-making environment, less stress on participants and a large number of the latter. Can we obtain plausible results from online experiments by using...

We show that subjects who set their minimum acceptable offer to zero in an ultimatum game are the most generous players in a dictator game. This finding challenges the interpretation of the acceptance of low offers as payoff-maximizing behavior.

We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game...

I put forward a concise and intuitive formula for the calculation of the valuation for a good in the presence of the expectation that further, related, goods will soon become available. This valuation is tractable in the sense that it does not require the explicit resolution of the consumer’s...

We observe that identification of the discount rate from experimental data requires an assumption about the consumption period, the length of time over which a payment will be turned into utility-providing consumption. We show that the optimal consumption period is substantially longer than...

We test the implications of ambiguity aversion in a principal–agent problem with multiple agents. Models of ambiguity aversion suggest that, under ambiguity, comparative compensation schemes may become more attractive than independent wage contracts. We test this by presenting agents with a...

This study presents results of the validation of an ultra-short survey measure of patience included in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Survey responses predict intertemporal choice behavior in incentive-compatible decisions in a representative sample of the German adult population.

I study a single-agent dynamic purchase problem by using a Gul and Pesendorfer’s [Gul, F., Pesendorfer, W., 2007. Harmful addiction. Review of Economic Studies 74 (1), 147–172] dynamic preference: extreme self-control cannot be sustained and leads to addiction. This type of agent exhibits...

We study dictator allocations using a 2×2 experimental design that varies the level of anonymity and the choice set, allowing observation of audience effects in both give and take frames. Changes in the distribution of responses across treatment cells allow us to distinguish among alternative...