We provide supporting evidence from the laboratory for the Nash predictions of the homogeneous-good Bertrand model under asymmetric constant unit costs.

We analyze the formation of bilateral R&D collaborations in an oligopoly when each firm benefits from the research done by other firms it is connected to. In contrast to myopic stability, farsighted stability leads to R&D networks consisting of two minimally connected components, with the...

In the dominant firm-competitive fringe model, where firms purchase input from a common supplier via two-part tariff contracts, we demonstrate that countervailing power may be neutral. Unlike Chen (2003), more countervailing power may not lead to lower consumer prices.

This paper analyzes location and price choices of firms and subsequent location choices of consumers in a linear city model when consumers have different perceptions of locations and firms. The study utilizes a continuous logit model to describe consumers’ location and supplier choices. A...

In this paper, we examine a free entry aggregative game where agents can be asymmetric. We show the existence of a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of this game. The proof is a constructive one and therefore we provide a method to derive a subgame perfect equilibrium within a reasonable...

Regressions of price differences between locations in different countries without controlling for the local market structure and the location of origin will lead to a biased estimate of the impact of national boundaries. We demonstrate that non-classical measurement error in distance and...

This study analyzes one-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with demand uncertainty. We demonstrate that the weight on public information regarding a follower’s estimation of demand uncertainty determines the strategic relationship between the leader and each follower. When the...

The conditions under which a government would initiate a fiscal incentive scheme to encourage the use of an eco-label in a duopoly are determined. The results reveal a scope for fiscal incentive provision in conjunction with the eco-label scheme for highly polluting industries.

We provide a reduced form model that encompasses a range of static explanations for the Edgeworth cycle. The model distills two common features that lie behind a range of intuitive explanations for Edgeworth cycles: discontinuity in demand and a positive residual demand.

We revisit the classic discussion of the endogenous choice of a price or a quantity contract, but in a mixed duopoly. We find that choosing the price contract is a dominant strategy for both firms, whether the goods are substitutes or complements.