We experimentally compare two partnership dissolution mechanisms, the widely-used buy–sell clause and the winner’s bid auction. While standard theory does well in organizing many laboratory patterns, it does not easily capture that many subjects bid valuations, especially in the buy–sell...

The integrated assessment literature frequently replicates uncertainty by averaging Monte Carlo runs of deterministic models. This Monte Carlo analysis is, in essence, an averaged sensitivity analyses. The approach resolves all uncertainty before the first time period, drawing parameters from a...

I propose a simple method to nonparametrically estimate the utility function in first-price, sealed-bid auctions when bidders’ participation is exogenous. Using a pair of bid densities, each for a different number of bidders, I establish a contraction mapping that converges to the true utility...

This paper studies communication and reputation in market interactions using data from online procurement auctions. Positive reputation ratings and engaging in communication increase a bidder’s probability of winning. Messages are primarily used to reduce the asymmetric information associated...

We extend the correspondences between adaptive learning algorithms and the Kalman filter to formulations with time-varying gains. Our correspondences hold exactly, in a computational implementation sense, and we discuss how they relate to previous approximate correspondences found in the literature.

Using a statistical methodology guided by a genetic algorithm, we select the best econometric model for explaining the severity of the 2008 crisis, with the main determinant being the percentage of bank claims on private sector over deposits in the year 2006.

Poaching externality, arising from job-to-job turnovers, implies that a planner should allocate fewer resources to costly job creations. However, these search efforts increase competition among employers, and this could in turn internalize the externality, whereas the congestion externality...

We study multivariate prevention decisions by disentangling early and late prevention. We show how the modularity of prevention and several measures of prevention efficiency interact with the agent’s risk attitude. We derive comparative statics with respect to impatience, loss severity, and...

We examine a generic three-stage game for two players with alternating moves, where the first player can choose the level of adjustment cost to be paid in the last period to modify the action she announced in the first period. In the resulting continuum of commitment options, convexifying the...

We extend Bergstrom and Cornes (1983) to show that for strong independence of efficient allocations from distribution in a public goods economy, the utility functions of all consumers must identically be of the form: A(Y)Xi, where Y and Xi are respectively the quantities of public good and...