Anton and Yao (1989) show that in split-award procurement auctions bidders coordinate their bids to sustain high buyer price. We relax their assumption that the buyer has full information about the suppliers’ production costs and restore the coordination outcome.

We examine the impact of the type of past experience for de novo contractors on business duration. Our results show that early involvement as a subcontractor in government procurement projects increases the chance of survival.

We study a model of procurement auctions in which information policies can be used to treat two heterogeneous suppliers asymmetrically. The buyer is shown to be better off revealing information about her preferences to the weak supplier only, when there is a sufficient cost difference between...

We analyze multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk-averse suppliers. As the number of suppliers increases or the suppliers become more risk-averse, the equilibrium bidding price decreases under the first-score auction but remains the same under the second-score auction. A buyer prefers...

The government wants two tasks to be performed. In each task, unobservable effort can be exerted by a wealth-constrained private contractor. If the government faces no binding budget constraints, it is optimal to bundle the tasks. The contractor in charge of both tasks then gets a bonus payment...

We consider the contribution of reserves to the efficient mobilization of military manpower. Our analysis suggests that offering recruits an option to serve as reservists enhances social welfare if there is a sufficiently strong relationship between recruit performance in the military and their...

We examine a housing market with price controls and show how the allocation problem can be solved through a price system. We demonstrate that the auction of Talman and Yang (2008) always generates a core allocation, thus resulting in a Pareto efficient and stable outcome.

We provide extensions of the Bulow and Klemperer (1996) result when the seller has value for the object above the minimum value of the buyers. The result may fail. We show that the seller does better with more participation and some exclusion than the optimal exclusion of buyers of low value...

We establish the effort-maximizing rule of allocating heterogeneous prizes when contestants privately observe their effort efficiencies. With ex ante symmetric players and increasing virtual effort efficiency, an all pay auction maximizes the total expected effort.

We study the assignment of agents to clubs in a frictional market environment. Club entry is endogenous and clubs compete by posting reserve prices in a competing auctions game prior to the agents’ decisions regarding which club to visit. The competing auctions equilibrium is constrained...