Members of a shareholder meeting or legislative committee have greater or smaller voting power than meets the eye if the nucleolus of the induced majority game differs from the voting weight distribution. We establish a new sufficient condition for the weight and power distributions to be equal,...

We characterize and compare equilibrium pricing strategies in a marketing channel in two scenarios. In the first scenario, the manufacturer chooses the wholesale prices of the two versions of a product, i.e., tangible and digital. and the retailer their prices to consumer. In the second...

We examine a housing market with price controls and show how the allocation problem can be solved through a price system. We demonstrate that the auction of Talman and Yang (2008) always generates a core allocation, thus resulting in a Pareto efficient and stable outcome.

In social choice settings with linear preferences, random dictatorship is known to be the only social decision scheme satisfying strategyproofness and ex post efficiency. When also allowing indifferences, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a well-known generalization of random dictatorship that...

We provide new characterisations of the equal surplus division value. This way, the difference between the Shapley value, the equal surplus division value, and the equal division value is pinpointed to one axiom.

We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by efficiency, fairness and a new axiom called fair distribution of the surplus.

The absence of simultaneous cycles is a sufficient condition for the existence of singleton cores. Acyclicity in the preferences of either side of the market is a minimal condition that guarantees the existence of singleton cores.

Monetary incentives in online experiments are not always easy to implement. Yet online experiments are advantageous in terms of a natural decision-making environment, less stress on participants and a large number of the latter. Can we obtain plausible results from online experiments by using...

A new axiom, symmetry-based compromise, is introduced to study solutions to convex bargaining problems. It is shown that any efficient solution that is also scale invariant and satisfies symmetry-based compromise must be Nash.

This paper starts from a classical fair division situation of allocating an object among a set of agents. The problem is studied from both a cooperative and a bankruptcy point of view, analyzing the fairness properties of the proposed solutions.