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Competition and collusion with fixed output

Zenger, Hans - In: Economics Letters 120 (2013) 2, pp. 259-261

between different markets. This paper shows that collusion in such industries leads firms to shift output from high …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678818

The effect of leniency programs on endogenous collusion

Park, Sangwon - In: Economics Letters 122 (2014) 2, pp. 326-330

The objective of a leniency program is to reduce sanctions against collusion if a participant voluntarily confesses his … the collusion amount; furthermore, he presented a sufficient condition under which the maximum leniency is optimal. After … extending the model by endogenizing the degree of collusion as well as equilibrium selection in the self-reporting stage, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743731

Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence

Fonseca, Miguel A.; Normann, Hans-Theo - In: Economics Letters 125 (2014) 2, pp. 223-225

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that the four-firm industries form cartels more often than the duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076534

Bundled discounts: Strategic substitutes or complements?

Brito, Duarte; Vasconcelos, Helder - In: Economics Letters 124 (2014) 2, pp. 278-282

Bundled discounts by pairs of otherwise independent firms play an increasingly important role as a strategic tool in several industries. Given that prices of firms competing for the same consumers are strategic complements, one would expect their discounts levels also to be strategic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933297

Passive partial ownership, sneaky takeovers, and merger control

Jovanovic, Dragan; Wey, Christian - In: Economics Letters 125 (2014) 1, pp. 32-35

We analyze the impact of passive partial ownership (PPO) on horizontal mergers. We show that antitrust authorities ignoring the effects of previous PPO acquisitions invite sneaky takeovers: a PPO is strategically used prior to a full takeover to get a merger approved which is in fact detrimental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939488

Leading merger in a Stackelberg oligopoly: Profitability and consumer welfare

Liu, Chih-Chen; Wang, Leonard F.S. - In: Economics Letters 129 (2015) C, pp. 1-3

This paper examines the effects of obtaining a strategic advantage of becoming the leader in the market on insiders’ incentives to merge and consumer welfare. We show that being the market leader is privately profitable for the merging insiders. We also show that the leading merger would...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263415

Using cost pass-through to calibrate demand

Miller, Nathan H.; Remer, Marc; Sheu, Gloria - In: Economics Letters 118 (2013) 3, pp. 451-454

We demonstrate that cost pass-through can be used to inform demand calibration, potentially eliminating the need for data on margins, diversion, or both. We derive the relationship between cost pass-through and consumer demand using a general oligopoly model of Nash–Bertrand competition and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010688076

Merger and entry-license tax

Cato, Susumu; Matsumura, Toshihiro - In: Economics Letters 119 (2013) 1, pp. 11-13

This paper investigates how horizontal mergers affect the optimal entry barrier (tax) in the presence of free entry and exit. We show that the government should raise the entry tax when a merger reduces the total number of firms entering.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662395

More competitors or more competition? Market concentration and the intensity of competition

Menezes, Flavio M.; Quiggin, John - In: Economics Letters 117 (2012) 3, pp. 712-714

We present a model of competitive interaction among n symmetric firms producing a homogeneous good that includes both Bertrand and Cournot competition as special cases. In our model the intensity of competition is captured by a single parameter—the perceived slope of competitors’ supply...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041650

Price discrimination or uniform pricing: Which colludes more?

Horstmann, Niklas; Krämer, Jan - In: Economics Letters 120 (2013) 3, pp. 379-383

the two pricing regimes, we find that tacit price collusion is systematically higher under price discrimination than under …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041562

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