In the problem of allocating workers to different projects, where each project needs a minimum number of workers assigned to it, the serial dictatorship mechanism is neither strategy proof nor Pareto efficient. We therefore propose a strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient mechanism.

School choice programs–school vouchers, open enrollment, tuition tax credits and charter schools–reduce the cost of sending children to a school different than their assignment. Previous literature shows support for school choice is weaker in objectively high-performing school districts. We...

We provide a short proof for the following characterization of the core in housing markets first proved by Ma (1994): the core is the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and individual rationality.

This article examines the effects of a tax on vacant dwellings. I use a search equilibrium model in which the distribution of rent is the result of the owners’ posting strategy. I show that this tax reduces the number of vacant dwellings and increases the average rent.

This paper examines the effects of charter schools on student achievement at neighboring traditional schools. The study shows that charter school entry does not induce indirect impact on non-overlapping grades but generates positive direct impact on overlapping grades. I also demonstrate that...

Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) show that some naive participants may be better off under the Boston mechanism than under deferred acceptance. Here we show that under the veil of ignorance all naive students may prefer the Boston mechanism.