We investigate parochial altruism, the combination of in-group altruism and out-group hostility, in an experimental conflict game preceded by a prisoner’s dilemma. Our data are consistent with parochial altruism, but cannot be explained by in-group pro-sociality or out-group hostility alone.

This paper presents experimental evidence from a simple three-person game showing that many individuals are willing to avenge third-party punishment in one-shot interactions. The threat of counter-punishment has a large negative effect on the willingness of third parties to punish selfish...

This paper investigates whether risk preferences inform the decision of how much to put into the public account in the public goods game under the three different frames (the two house money effect frames: the standard and covered-loss frames, as well as the real-loss frame). The main...

In a one-shot Prisoners’ dilemma experiment, female participants are highly sensitive to the social frame. Male participants are not.

I examine two dimensions of framing in public goods games: Contributing vs. Taking and Gains vs. Losses. I find decreased cooperation under the Taking frame, but not under the Loss frame. This framing effect is stronger for men than women.

In this paper we analyze how biased lotteries can be used to overcome the free-riding problem in voluntary public good provision. We characterize the optimal combinations of bias and lottery prize and the conditions that guarantee efficient public good provision in equilibrium.

Within the confines of linear tax and complete market, we show that the efficiency force for a negative capital tax may not be strong enough to reverse the politico-economic force for a positive redistributive taxation under temptation and self-control preferences.