This study analyzes one-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with demand uncertainty. We demonstrate that the weight on public information regarding a follower’s estimation of demand uncertainty determines the strategic relationship between the leader and each follower. When the...

We examine a generic three-stage game for two players with alternating moves, where the first player can choose the level of adjustment cost to be paid in the last period to modify the action she announced in the first period. In the resulting continuum of commitment options, convexifying the...

We provide supporting evidence from the laboratory for the Nash predictions of the homogeneous-good Bertrand model under asymmetric constant unit costs.

We show that the price-setting subgame in the classic Hotelling’s model (1929) with the linear transport costs has the unique equilibrium solution for all location pairs under the assumption that duopolists secure themselves against being driven out of the market by undercutting. In contrast...

This paper (a) characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium of the unidirectional Hotelling–Downs game in which firms maximize their market shares, for any distribution of the consumers, and (b) analyzes equilibrium behavior in the variation of the game in which each firm aims to secure a larger...

We propose a strategy to identify the complementarity or substitutability among technology bundles. Differences between the observed distribution of technology choices can be subjected to statistical tests. Combinations of technologies that occur with greater frequency than would occur under...

This paper analyzes the unilateral choices of application compatibility by platforms and the endogenous affiliations of two different groups (content providers and users). We find a novel result that for both platforms to unilaterally choose application compatibility is not an equilibrium unless...

This paper extends a discrete-choice model of differentiated product demand to consider consumer heterogeneity in dynamic games. Our approach applies to games involving both multi-product firms and static price competition.

This paper examines the effects of obtaining a strategic advantage of becoming the leader in the market on insiders’ incentives to merge and consumer welfare. We show that being the market leader is privately profitable for the merging insiders. We also show that the leading merger would...

This paper investigates the impacts of competition structures on firms’ incentives for adopting strategic environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) certified by a Non-Governmental Organization. We show that, to induce firms to adopt certified ECSR, the certifier will set a standard...