We provide new characterisations of the equal surplus division value. This way, the difference between the Shapley value, the equal surplus division value, and the equal division value is pinpointed to one axiom.

We provide a new interpretation of the potential of the Shapley value as the expected worth of some random partition of the player set. Using this insight, we advocate the potential as an index of power concentration in simple monotonic games.

We study the consequences of a solidarity property that specifies how a value for cooperative games should respond if some player forfeits his productivity, i.e., becomes a null player. Nullified solidarity states that in this case either all players weakly gain together or all players weakly...

We resolve a seeming conflict between a non-existence result on solutions to coalition formation in hedonic games [Barbera, S., Gerber, A., 2007. A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games. Economics Letters 95, 85-90] and the universal...