Showing 1 - 10 of 106
We establish the effort-maximizing rule of allocating heterogeneous prizes when contestants privately observe their effort efficiencies. With ex ante symmetric players and increasing virtual effort efficiency, an all pay auction maximizes the total expected effort.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116209
We study the strategic interaction between a decision maker who needs to take a binary decision but is uncertain about relevant facts and an informed expert who can send a message to the decision maker but has a preference over the decision. We show that the probability that the expert can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933302
Recent research on the Condorcet Jury Theorem has proven that informative voting (that is, voting according to one’s signal) is not necessarily rational. With two alternatives, rational voting typically leads to the election of the correct alternative, in spite of the fact that not all voters...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939509
We consider two-player, perfectly discriminatory, common-value contests (or all-pay auctions), in which one player knows the value of the contested object with certainty, and the other knows only its prior distribution. We show, among other things, that in equilibrium the players win with equal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041833
We prove that the maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions is the same for all bidders. Our proof is elementary, and does not require that bidders are risk neutral, or that the distribution functions of their valuations are independent or smooth.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743703
An alternative is a Condorcet winner if it beats all other alternatives in a pairwise majority vote. A social choice correspondence is a Condorcet extension if it selects the Condorcet winners–and nothing else–whenever a Condorcet winner exists. It is well known that Condorcet extensions are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263427
We consider a multi-winner nested elimination contest in which losers are sequentially eliminated to attain the set of winners. This is a variant of a widely used mechanism introduced by Clark and Riis (1996) that allows one to select the winners sequentially. We show that the current mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116203
In this paper we analyze how biased lotteries can be used to overcome the free-riding problem in voluntary public good provision. We characterize the optimal combinations of bias and lottery prize and the conditions that guarantee efficient public good provision in equilibrium.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116204
We explore the impact of donor–recipient ideological differences on US economic aid decisions. We find that the odds and the amount of aid to left-wing recipients are higher under left-wing US administrations. The opposite result is found for center-right recipients.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010776614
The classic democratic theory of redistribution claims that an increase in the mean-to-median (MM) income ratio causes a majority coalition in the electorate to collectively demand more redistribution. The functional dependence of redistribution on the MM income ratio is tested in parametric and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010776625