Showing 1 - 10 of 138
supplier or end consumer has monotonic effects on the welfare of initial suppliers and end consumers but may simultaneously …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664125
We show that the Nash demand game has the fictitious play property. We also show that almost every fictitious play process and its associated belief path converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the Nash demand game.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743686
We study asymmetric partnerships and show that efficient dissolution is possible if critical types (where participation constraints bind) are equal. Ownership structures guaranteeing equal critical types always exist, but can be extremely unequal.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041810
We develop and characterize analytically an investment model in discrete time with a fixed adjustment cost not … proportional to existing capital and complete irreversibility that reproduces the lumpiness of investment at the micro-level. In … agreement with the empirical evidence, as a firm size increases, investment becomes less lumpy. The optimal policy is of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930713
exhibit high and significant investment-cash flow sensitivities. Our findings provide a new explanation for why some …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594188
We propose a model of production where technical change is both time and management induced. We define a general management index in addition to the general time index of Baltagi and Griffin (1988) and use them as arguments in the translog production function. Time and management induced...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665684
We compare dictator and impunity games. In impunity games, responders can reject offers but to no payoff consequence to proposers. Because proposers act under impunity, we should expect the same behavior across games, but experimentally observed behavior varies. Responders indeed exercise the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011687301
In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I provide new necessary and new sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable allocation. These new conditions exploit the fact that one side of the market has strict preferences over individual contracts.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906356
Consider a non-governmental organization (NGO) that can invest in a public good. Should the government or the NGO own the public project? In an incomplete contracting framework with split-the-difference bargaining, Besley and Ghatak (2001) argue that the party who values the public good most...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939486
This paper investigates the two-sided many-to-many matching problem, where every agent has max–min preference. The equivalence between the pairwise-stability and the setwise-stability is obtained. It is shown that the pairwise-stability implies the strong corewise-stability and the former may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263446