We add social norms into Laffont’s mechanism designed for environmental risk. We find with endogenous social norms and asymmetric information about personal norms, the optimal contract induces more (less) effort from the “green” (“brown”) firm.

How do people react to a mix of good deeds to a third party and bad deeds against them? A modified ultimatum game shows that previous good deeds make responders substantially more tolerant to unfair proposals.

We revisit job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities from a different perspective, extending Schmitz (2013a). When two sequential tasks need to be performed by wealth-constrained agents, the principal can hire only one agent or two different agents. When there exists an outcome...

We analyze a task-assignment model in which a principal assigns a task to one of two agents depending on future states. If the agents have concave utility, the principal assigns the task to them contingent on the state. We show that if the agents are loss averse, a state-independent...

Behavioral economists have argued that incentives can backfire. In a field experiment, we distribute “no junk mail” stickers to more than 800 households. We introduce information, monitoring, and rewards in treatments. We do not find evidence of motivation crowding out.

We investigate social norms for dictator game giving using a recently proposed norm-elicitation procedure (Krupka and Weber, 2013). We elicit norms separately from dictator, recipient, and disinterested third party respondents and find that elicited norms are stable and insensitive to the role...

In most demographic transitions, declines in child mortality precede declines in net fertility rates. Variants of the Barro–Becker model of fertility fail to deliver this link. A simple extension, the inclusion of social norms regarding fertility, generates the desired effect.

In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.

Consider an environment such as a political election where a principal requires the completion of multiple tasks, but an agent can only be rewarded with a hire/fire decision rather than an endogenously chosen monetary payment. When the principal hires a single agent to perform multiple tasks,...

We offer a model that combines a knowledge based organizational structure with progressive learning of employees’ talent. We show that higher span of control is associated with better selected managers, higher wages, higher probability to be promoted, and higher turn-over in the early career...