We analyze the formality benefits through productivity-enhancing public goods. We document that: benefits from formality matter for firms’ optimal decisions; there is a disconnect between the objectives of maximizing formality versus welfare; this disconnect is mitigated under higher formality...

A home production model that explicitly accounts for taxes and public expenditures on day-care and elder-care, substitutes for work households perform at home, is used to evaluate the welfare implications of alternative public expenditure policies. Both subsidy and workfare policies are welfare...

In a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, this note shows that beyond a certain low level, financial development is associated with higher relative consumption–income volatility in the presence of a working capital constraint. Informality on the other hand...

Using a novel dataset on 2012 tax inspections by the Hellenic Ministry of Finance in tourist and high economic activity areas in 13 regions in Greece we find significant evidence that the intensification of tax audits can induce tax compliance.

We consider a dual labor market with a frictional formal sector and a competitive informal sector. We show that the size of the informal sector is generally too large compared to the optimal allocation of the workers. It follows that our results give a rationale to informality-reducing policies.

We use a unique data set of trust game replications to validate the commonly used “trust” question from the World Values Survey. We find that trust as measured by the World Values Survey is positively correlated with experimentally measured trust.

Many artists are prone to high unemployment and low incomes suggesting low job satisfaction. Our analysis including 49 countries paints a different picture. On average artists enjoy higher job satisfaction than other employees, mainly due to more autonomy.

When penalties for first-time offenders are restricted, it is typically optimal for the lawmaker to overdeter repeat offenders. First-time offenders are then deterred not only by the (restricted) fine for a first offense, but also by the prospect of a large fine for a subsequent offense. Now...

Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets has become a very important issue in the empirical literature in the last years. We analyze the (private) accident insurance, which has not been analyzed before in the literature, but covers one of the most important risks faced by...

We provide extensions of the Bulow and Klemperer (1996) result when the seller has value for the object above the minimum value of the buyers. The result may fail. We show that the seller does better with more participation and some exclusion than the optimal exclusion of buyers of low value...