We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by efficiency, fairness and a new axiom called fair distribution of the surplus.

A number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to several bidders. Each bidder demands at most one item. The price of each item is not completely flexible but restricted to some admissible interval. Due to price rigidities, a Walrasian equilibrium usually fails to exist. To facilitate the...

We study cooperative games with transferable utility and limited cooperation possibilities. The focus is on communication structures where the set of players forms a circle, so that the possibilities of cooperation are represented by the connected sets of nodes of an undirected circular graph....

We show by means of an example that the result of Arrow [Arrow, K.J. (1953), Le rôle des valeurs boursières pour la répartition la meilleure des risques, Econométrie, 41-47, CNRS, Paris; translated as The role of securities in the optimal allocation of risk bearing, Review of Economic...

This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the equilibria of strategic bargaining games. A first example shows non-convergence to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. A second example demonstrates the possibility of multiple limits.