Showing 1 - 10 of 126
In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I provide new necessary and new sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable allocation. These new conditions exploit the fact that one side of the market has strict preferences over individual contracts.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906356
In the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (Hart, 1995), parties bargain about whether or not to collaborate after non-contractible investments have been made. Most contributions apply the regular Nash bargaining solution. We explore the implications of using the generalized Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662387
We reconsider the property rights approach to the theory of the firm based on incomplete contracts. We explore the implications of different degrees of relationship-specificity when there are two parties, A and B, who can make investments in physical capital (instead of human capital). If...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664120
Consider a non-governmental organization (NGO) that can invest in a public good. Should the government or the NGO own the public project? In an incomplete contracting framework with split-the-difference bargaining, Besley and Ghatak (2001) argue that the party who values the public good most...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939486
A comprehensive theory of large strategic games with (socioeconomic and biological) traits (LSGT) has recently been presented in Khan et al. (2012, 2013), and we present a reformulation pertaining to large distributional games with traits (LDGT).
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041659
An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent to provide a public good. Private information of the agent about his valuation may either decrease or increase his investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594093
We examine the optimal contract for experts with type-dependent reservation wage. We show that Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985)’s result, the possibility of achieving the truthful revelation of information with full surplus extraction, can be achieved with relaxing the restriction on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594140
We consider an adverse selection model in which the agent can gather private information before the principal offers the contract. In scenario I, information gathering is a hidden action, while in scenario II, it is observable. We study how the two scenarios differ. Specifically, the principal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662380
This paper provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of nonautarkic contract in a risk sharing model with two-sided lack of commitment. Verifying the condition takes just one Gaussian elimination of a matrix.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664134
Implementability conditions in Rochet (1987) are extended to utility functions not necessarily quasilinear in the transfer, or linear in the type, for the case where agents’ information is one-dimensional but actions become multidimensional. The results obtained are relevant for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576432