Central banks face uncertainty about potential output. We model optimal monetary policy under discretion in a situation in which the central bank adopts a min–max approach to policy. The case for appointing a conservative central banker who puts a larger weight on inflation stabilization...

We identify the conditions where robust mean–variance preferences, which capture ambiguity aversion, are observationally nonequivalent to subjective mean–variance preferences. Conversely, we also provide an example showing that observational equivalence holds regardless of the degree of...

We test the implications of ambiguity aversion in a principal–agent problem with multiple agents. Models of ambiguity aversion suggest that, under ambiguity, comparative compensation schemes may become more attractive than independent wage contracts. We test this by presenting agents with a...

We consider two plausible and even natural examples of ambiguity aversion: the classical Ellsberg (1961) two-color paradox and a variant of the Machina (2009) reflection example. We extend the results of Baillon et al. (2011) and demonstrate that these two examples challenge the descriptive...

We describe an ambiguity hedging problem in Ellsberg experiments, where combinations of individually ambiguous bets eliminate aggregate ambiguity, and which may yield incorrect classifications of ambiguity averse subjects. We propose a new classification consistent with this hedging possibility.

This letter develops a set of simple conditions under which an individual is willing to save an extra amount of money due to the presence of ambiguity concerning his second period wealth. This extra precautionary saving motive is naturally associated with the notion of ambiguity prudence.