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Reservation wage and optimal contract for experts
Jun, Jooyong; Yoon, Kyoung-Soo - In: Economics Letters 117 (2012) 3, pp. 619-623
We examine the optimal contract for experts with type-dependent reservation wage. We show that Bhattacharya and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594140
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A model of leverage based on risk sharing
Wang, Tianxi - In: Economics Letters 119 (2013) 1, pp. 97-100
endogenizes debt as the optimal contract for external financing, thereby capturing two features of leverage: debt serves to boost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041772
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Information provision before a contract is offered
Kim, Jaesoo; Shin, Dongsoo - In: Economics Letters 124 (2014) 3, pp. 490-493
This paper considers an agency model in which the agent can update the principal’s belief before the contract is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930721
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Moral hazard with the (unlikely) possibility of catastrophes
Bednarek, Ziemowit; Patel, Pratish - In: Economics Letters 124 (2014) 3, pp. 386-388
compensation contract between a principal and an agent. The optimal contract depends on all the moments and not just the variance. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930737
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Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics Letters 117 (2012) 3, pp. 642-645
An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent … investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type before or after the investment stage. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594093
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Observability of information acquisition in agency models
Hoppe, Eva I. - In: Economics Letters 119 (2013) 1, pp. 104-107
the contract. In scenario I, information gathering is a hidden action, while in scenario II, it is observable. We study …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662380
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When can we do better than autarky?
Tian, Guoqiang; Zhang, Yuzhe - In: Economics Letters 119 (2013) 3, pp. 328-331
This paper provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of nonautarkic contract in a risk sharing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664134
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On the implementability of contracts without quasilinear utility
Ruiz del Portal, X. - In: Economics Letters 116 (2012) 1, pp. 42-45
Implementability conditions in Rochet (1987) are extended to utility functions not necessarily quasilinear in the transfer, or linear in the type, for the case where agents’ information is one-dimensional but actions become multidimensional. The results obtained are relevant for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576432
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Persuasion and learning by countersignaling
Chung, Kim-Sau; Eső, Péter - In: Economics Letters 121 (2013) 3, pp. 487-491
We model countersignaling (i.e., very high types refraining from signaling) arising from the tradeoff between persuasion and learning in a signaling game. We assume that the agent has imperfect private information regarding his/her productivity, which the signaling action provides additional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041613
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Tournaments with gaps
Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - In: Economics Letters 122 (2014) 2, pp. 211-214
A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents’ performance is measured on a cardinal scale …, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041826