I demonstrate that providing information about product quality is not necessarily the best way to address asymmetric information problems when markets are imperfectly competitive. In a vertical differentiation model I show that a Minimum Quality Standard, which retains asymmetric information,...

This paper investigates how horizontal mergers affect the optimal entry barrier (tax) in the presence of free entry and exit. We show that the government should raise the entry tax when a merger reduces the total number of firms entering.

We analyze how network regulation affects investment into network infrastructure and complementary services. While regulation negatively affects investment incentives in the regulated network market, the effects of network regulation on investment in complementary services can be either negative...

We show that the waterbed effect, i.e. the pass-through of a change in one price of a firm to its other prices, is much stronger if the latter include subscription rather than only usage fees. In particular, in mobile network competition with a fixed number of customers, the waterbed effect is...

We examine a generic three-stage game for two players with alternating moves, where the first player can choose the level of adjustment cost to be paid in the last period to modify the action she announced in the first period. In the resulting continuum of commitment options, convexifying the...

This paper extends a discrete-choice model of differentiated product demand to consider consumer heterogeneity in dynamic games. Our approach applies to games involving both multi-product firms and static price competition.

When penalties for first-time offenders are restricted, it is typically optimal for the lawmaker to overdeter repeat offenders. First-time offenders are then deterred not only by the (restricted) fine for a first offense, but also by the prospect of a large fine for a subsequent offense. Now...

In 2013, Beladi et al. constructed a dynamic general equilibrium model of pollution, and characterized a steady-state equilibrium. In this paper, we extend Beladi et al.’s model to an even more general model in which the pollution abatement costs under learning by doing are taken into account....

In response to the imposition of steep enough sanctions for employing illegal migrants, the firm reassigns managers from supervision of production to verification of the legality of its workforce. This impedes production efficiency, reduces wages, and hurts the native workers.

Under multiplicative separability of the cost function, this paper investigates the identification of the procurement model. Moreover, we characterize the model restrictions on observables and show its observational equivalence to one where the function of private information is the identity.