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Bishnu, Monisankar; Wang, Min - In: Economics Letters 118 (2013) 3, pp. 419-423

Within the confines of linear tax and complete market, we show that the efficiency force for a negative capital tax may not be strong enough to reverse the politico-economic force for a positive redistributive taxation under temptation and self-control preferences.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010688079

A characterization of the plurality rule

Sekiguchi, Yohei - In: Economics Letters 116 (2012) 3, pp. 330-332

We consider an axiomatic characterization of the plurality rule, which selects the alternative(s) most preferred by the largest number of individuals. We strengthen the characterization result of Yeh [Yeh, C.-H., 2008. An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594062

Another direct proof for the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem

Ninjbat, Uuganbaatar - In: Economics Letters 116 (2012) 3, pp. 418-421

We prove the following result which is equivalent to the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem: when there are at least 3 alternatives, for any unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, at any given profile if an individual’s top ranked alternative differs from the social choice, then she...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594069

A simple microfoundation for the utilization of fragmentation indexes to measure the performance of a team

Le Maux, Benoit; Rocaboy, Yvon - In: Economics Letters 116 (2012) 3, pp. 491-493

We propose a simple non-cooperative game model in which two fragmented teams compete to increase their performance. The theoretical framework is based on the theory of conflict. We show that, depending on the value of a parameter in the model, the power of the competing teams may be expressed as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594104

Impossibilities with Kemeny updating

Can, Burak; Storcken, Ton - In: Economics Letters 116 (2012) 2, pp. 229-231

Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept are discussed. Here monotonicity means that if preferences update in such a way that they get closer to an outcome then at the new situation this outcome remains chosen. Strong monotonicity requires further...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010597177

Condorcet Jury Theorem: An example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation

Goertz, Johanna M.M.; Maniquet, François - In: Economics Letters 125 (2014) 1, pp. 25-28

Recent research on the Condorcet Jury Theorem has proven that informative voting (that is, voting according to one …’s signal) is not necessarily rational. With two alternatives, rational voting typically leads to the election of the correct … in which informative voting is rational and yet leads to the election of a wrong alternative. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939509

Preference domains and the monotonicity of condorcet extensions

Healy, Paul J.; Peress, Michael - In: Economics Letters 130 (2015) C, pp. 21-23

An alternative is a Condorcet winner if it beats all other alternatives in a pairwise majority vote. A social choice correspondence is a Condorcet extension if it selects the Condorcet winners–and nothing else–whenever a Condorcet winner exists. It is well known that Condorcet extensions are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263427

The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information

Kotowski, Maciej H.; Li, Fei - In: Economics Letters 124 (2014) 3, pp. 420-423

We provide a simple example demonstrating that the unconditional revelation information in a war of attrition with private budget constraints can decrease expected revenue. Our example suggests that information non-revelation can counteract the adverse revenue impact of budget constraints and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930710

The stability of decision making in committees: The one-core

Kenfack, Momo; Armel, Joseph; Pongou, Roland; … - In: Economics Letters 122 (2014) 3, pp. 390-395

We study the stability of decision making in committees. A policy proposal introduced by a committee member is either adopted or abandoned in favor of a new proposal after deliberations. If a proposal is abandoned, it is in spite of the committee member who introduced it, who does not cooperate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743673

Inflated ordered outcomes

Brooks, Robert; Harris, Mark N.; Spencer, Christopher - In: Economics Letters 117 (2012) 3, pp. 683-686

by applying it to Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee voting data. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594212

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