The absence of simultaneous cycles is a sufficient condition for the existence of singleton cores. Acyclicity in the preferences of either side of the market is a minimal condition that guarantees the existence of singleton cores.

In social choice settings with linear preferences, random dictatorship is known to be the only social decision scheme satisfying strategyproofness and ex post efficiency. When also allowing indifferences, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a well-known generalization of random dictatorship that...

A new axiom, symmetry-based compromise, is introduced to study solutions to convex bargaining problems. It is shown that any efficient solution that is also scale invariant and satisfies symmetry-based compromise must be Nash.

We establish a link between cooperative and competitive behavior. For every possible vector of weights of an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution there exists a market that has this asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as its unique competitive payoff vector.

In this paper, virtual implementation is restricted to deliver, on the equilibrium path, either a socially optimal outcome or a status quo: an outcome fixed for all preference profiles. Under such a restriction, for any unanimous and implementable social choice function there is a dictator, who...

We provide a short proof for the following characterization of the core in housing markets first proved by Ma (1994): the core is the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and individual rationality.

In the problem of allocating workers to different projects, where each project needs a minimum number of workers assigned to it, the serial dictatorship mechanism is neither strategy proof nor Pareto efficient. We therefore propose a strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient mechanism.

Members of a shareholder meeting or legislative committee have greater or smaller voting power than meets the eye if the nucleolus of the induced majority game differs from the voting weight distribution. We establish a new sufficient condition for the weight and power distributions to be equal,...

We characterize and compare equilibrium pricing strategies in a marketing channel in two scenarios. In the first scenario, the manufacturer chooses the wholesale prices of the two versions of a product, i.e., tangible and digital. and the retailer their prices to consumer. In the second...

We examine a housing market with price controls and show how the allocation problem can be solved through a price system. We demonstrate that the auction of Talman and Yang (2008) always generates a core allocation, thus resulting in a Pareto efficient and stable outcome.