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Multi-trait matching and gender differentials in intergenerational mobility

Chen, Natalie; Conconi, Paola; Perroni, Carlo - In: Economics Letters 120 (2013) 2, pp. 292-296

We describe a model of multi-trait matching and inheritance in which individuals’ attractiveness in the marriage market … characteristics are relatively more important in determining marriage outcomes for men than they are for women, and if they are more … increases homogamy in the marriage market and lowers social mobility for both genders. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678839

Does working with spouses make teams more productive? A field experiment in India using NREGA

Munro, Alistair; Verschoor, Arjan; Dubey, Amaresh - In: Economics Letters 118 (2013) 3, pp. 506-508

In Uttar Pradesh, teams of four are engaged to dig soil under the NREGA programme. In one treatment spouses work together; in the other treatment they work in separate teams. Working with spouses is associated with significantly higher output.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010688094

Lifestyles of the rich and polygynous in Cote d’Ivoire

Gould, Eric D.; Moav, Omer; Simhon, Avi - In: Economics Letters 115 (2012) 3, pp. 404-407

This paper investigates whether the sources of income, not just the levels, determine whether an individual is monogamous. Our results support the idea that polygyny stunts development by allowing wealthy men to acquire wives rather than investing in child quality.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576403

Opposite-sex coworkers and marital infidelity

Kuroki, Masanori - In: Economics Letters 118 (2013) 1, pp. 71-73

This paper examines if workplace sex ratios are associated with marital infidelity. I find that the likelihood of ever having been sexually unfaithful to a partner increases with a fraction of opposite-sex coworkers for men but not for women.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603110

Missing daughters, missing brides?

d’Albis, Hippolyte; de la Croix, David - In: Economics Letters 116 (2012) 3, pp. 358-360

Even in countries where there is a male-biased sex ratio, it is still possible for the marriage market to be balanced … at marriage, fertility rate, and sex ratio at birth, we rank countries according to the Missing Brides Index. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594171

Should we tax vacant dwellings? A search equilibrium model applied to the rental housing market

Ménard, Sébastien - In: Economics Letters 117 (2012) 1, pp. 88-90

This article examines the effects of a tax on vacant dwellings. I use a search equilibrium model in which the distribution of rent is the result of the owners’ posting strategy. I show that this tax reduces the number of vacant dwellings and increases the average rent.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010580472

Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts

Flanagan, Francis X. - In: Economics Letters 123 (2014) 2, pp. 113-117

In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I provide new necessary and new sufficient conditions for the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906356

Matching as a cure for underprovision of voluntary public good supply

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Cornes, Richard; Rübbelke, Dirk - In: Economics Letters 117 (2012) 3, pp. 727-729

Matching mechanisms are widely regarded as providing a promising way to cure the public good underprovision problem …, but the Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium emerges only under very special conditions. However, we show that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041792

Vacancies in supply chain networks

Hatfield, John William; Kominers, Scott Duke - In: Economics Letters 119 (2013) 3, pp. 354-357

We use the supply chain matching framework to study the effects of firm exit. We show that the exit of an initial …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664125

Matching with quorums

Monte, Daniel; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - In: Economics Letters 120 (2013) 1, pp. 14-17

In the problem of allocating workers to different projects, where each project needs a minimum number of workers assigned to it, the serial dictatorship mechanism is neither strategy proof nor Pareto efficient. We therefore propose a strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient mechanism.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665671