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Weber, Thomas A. - In: Economics Letters 124 (2014) 1, pp. 67-73

We examine a generic three-stage game for two players with alternating moves, where the first player can choose the level of adjustment cost to be paid in the last period to modify the action she announced in the first period. In the resulting continuum of commitment options, convexifying the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010784967

Solution of the Hotelling’s game in secure strategies

Iskakov, Mikhail; Iskakov, Alexey - In: Economics Letters 117 (2012) 1, pp. 115-118

We show that the price-setting subgame in the classic Hotelling’s model (1929) with the linear transport costs has the unique equilibrium solution for all location pairs under the assumption that duopolists secure themselves against being driven out of the market by undercutting. In contrast...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010580497

Equilibria in unidirectional spatial models

Xefteris, Dimitrios - In: Economics Letters 119 (2013) 2, pp. 146-149

This paper (a) characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium of the unidirectional Hotelling–Downs game in which firms maximize their market shares, for any distribution of the consumers, and (b) analyzes equilibrium behavior in the variation of the game in which each firm aims to secure a larger...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664152

Undesirable competition

Wang, Leonard F.S.; Mukherjee, Arijit - In: Economics Letters 114 (2012) 2, pp. 175-177

the consumers. Our result is important for competition policy. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576440

Application compatibility and affiliation in two-sided markets

Maruyama, Masayoshi; Zennyo, Yusuke - In: Economics Letters 130 (2015) C, pp. 39-42

This paper analyzes the unilateral choices of application compatibility by platforms and the endogenous affiliations of two different groups (content providers and users). We find a novel result that for both platforms to unilaterally choose application compatibility is not an equilibrium unless...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263393

Introducing consumer heterogeneity in dynamic games with multi-product firms and differentiated product demand

Macieira, João - In: Economics Letters 129 (2015) C, pp. 62-65

dynamic games. Our approach applies to games involving both multi-product firms and static price competition. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263409

Leading merger in a Stackelberg oligopoly: Profitability and consumer welfare

Liu, Chih-Chen; Wang, Leonard F.S. - In: Economics Letters 129 (2015) C, pp. 1-3

This paper examines the effects of obtaining a strategic advantage of becoming the leader in the market on insiders’ incentives to merge and consumer welfare. We show that being the market leader is privately profitable for the merging insiders. We also show that the leading merger would...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263415

Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a differentiated duopoly market

Liu, Chih-Chen; Wang, Leonard F.S.; Lee, Sang-Ho - In: Economics Letters 129 (2015) C, pp. 108-111

This paper investigates the impacts of competition structures on firms’ incentives for adopting strategic environmental … certified ECSR, the certifier will set a standard lower than the optimal one, and the standard in Cournot competition is higher … than that in Bertrand competition. Finally, we show that firms and consumers benefit from firms’ certified ECSR. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263444

Raising rivals’ cost through buyer power

Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus; Haucap, Justus; Wey, Christian - In: Economics Letters 126 (2015) C, pp. 181-184

We re-examine the view that a ban on price discrimination in input markets is particularly desirable in the presence of buyer power. This argument crucially depends on an inverse relationship between downstream firms’ profits and the uniform input price. Assuming different input efficiencies...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189534

Loss-leader pricing and upgrades

In, Younghwan; Wright, Julian - In: Economics Letters 122 (2014) 1, pp. 19-22

A new theory of loss-leader pricing is provided in which firms advertise low (below cost) prices for certain goods to signal that their other unadvertised (substitute) goods are not priced too high. The theory is applied to the pricing of upgrades. The results contrast with most existing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729458