Linear altruism predicts the estimated preferences to be independent of the subject’s position in the game, if the role allocation is randomly determined, because subjects, in each role, have the same preferences ex ante. We test and reject this hypothesis.

We show in a laboratory experiment that the same method of group induction carries different behavioral consequences. These heterogeneous treatment effects can be directly related to the quality of the relationship established between the subjects. Our results indicate the importance of...

We study dictator allocations using a 2×2 experimental design that varies the level of anonymity and the choice set, allowing observation of audience effects in both give and take frames. Changes in the distribution of responses across treatment cells allow us to distinguish among alternative...

We show that subjects who set their minimum acceptable offer to zero in an ultimatum game are the most generous players in a dictator game. This finding challenges the interpretation of the acceptance of low offers as payoff-maximizing behavior.

The purpose in this letter is to demonstrate, employing two parametric forms of the Markowitz model of utility, that heterogeneity of preferences of Markowitz agents can contribute towards an explanation of why lotteries typically have multiple rather than single prizes.

We demonstrate theoretically and illustrate the implications of assuming power utility when the true function is of the expo-power form. Empirical results can appear to be consistent with cumulative prospect theory when they are in fact generated from a Markowitz model.

We study behavior in the race game with the aim of assessing whether teams can create synergies. The race game has the advantage that the optimal strategy depends neither on beliefs about other players nor on distributional or efficiency concerns. Our results reveal that teams not only...

We provide supporting evidence from the laboratory for the Nash predictions of the homogeneous-good Bertrand model under asymmetric constant unit costs.

Non-governmental organizations and other non-profit organizations attract workers who strongly identify themselves with their missions. We study whether these “good guys” are more trustworthy, and how such pronounced group identities affect trust and trustworthiness within the groups and...