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We examine the use of breakup fees as a device for target firms to recruit white knights in response to a hostile takeover bid. When bidders have interdependent valuations of the target, the possible use of a breakup fee to subsidize entry of a subsequent bidder overdisciplines the initial...
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The current National Football League overtime rule favors the team starting on offense. Auctioning off or dividing-and-choosing the starting possession can potentially restore ex post fairness. We find auctions to provide a better outcome when teams have asymmetric information.
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