We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by efficiency, fairness and a new axiom called fair distribution of the surplus.

We conduct a laboratory experiment and provide evidence of learning spillovers within and across equivalence classes of “structurally similar” games. These spillovers are inconsistent with existing theories of learning in games.

The unfortunate set of circumstances surrounding the loss of both Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 led to the immediate grounding of the advertised ‘incredibly fuel efficient' Boeing 737-MAX. The side-effects of the decision to ground such flights led to delays and...

In this letter, we overcome the existing shortages with respect to the assignment of individuals to reference groups and are the first to show that individual aversion to relative deprivation plays a decisive role in shaping migration preferences.

This paper finds that the number of CEOs born in June and July is disproportionately small relative to the number of CEOs born in other months. Our evidence is consistent with the “relative-age effect” due to school admissions grouping together children with age differences up to one year,...

The academic labor market rewards idea splitting, where researchers publish several short articles rather than one long one. There is a significant positive effect on salary from publishing more articles, conditional on the total number of quality-adjusted pages ever published.

We examine a housing market with price controls and show how the allocation problem can be solved through a price system. We demonstrate that the auction of Talman and Yang (2008) always generates a core allocation, thus resulting in a Pareto efficient and stable outcome.

The absence of simultaneous cycles is a sufficient condition for the existence of singleton cores. Acyclicity in the preferences of either side of the market is a minimal condition that guarantees the existence of singleton cores.

A new axiom, symmetry-based compromise, is introduced to study solutions to convex bargaining problems. It is shown that any efficient solution that is also scale invariant and satisfies symmetry-based compromise must be Nash.