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The analyses of the tender offer premiums and of the means of payment should not be performed separately. In the empirical literature, these two variables are often considered independently, although they may have an endogenous relationship in a contractual setting. Using a sample of European...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010735772
Debt is not frequently analyzed in relation to the conflict between controlling and outside shareholders. At the same time, debt helps to manage the type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010790025
Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It supports an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010790035
The analyses of the tender offer premiums and of the means of payment should not be performed separately. In the empirical literature, these two variables are often considered independently, although they may have an endogenous relationship in a contractual setting. Using a sample of European...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010707317
Historically, most convertible bond (CB) issues have been converted to equity sooner or later. The announcement of a CB issue will bring about a future dilution of the firm's capital, and is often followed by a drop in share price. However, a CB issue by itself creates future value for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010707546
Controlled firms are in a framework where private benefits create a buffer between public earnings and economic profitability. We focus on debt leverage in the type II agency conflict between the controlling shareholder and outside investors. We use a simple discrete model comparing the capital...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010707651
Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998–2009 is empirically tested. It supports...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708251
Analysis of the tender offer premiums and of the means of payment should not be done separately. In the empirical literature these two variables are often considered independently although they may have endogenous relation in a contractual setting. Using a sample of European M&As over the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708590
The leveraging of control is the possibility for the controlling shareholder to lower his direct participation in capital through a convergence of financial and economic interest with other shareholders in the firm. In this paper, the setting of a coalition contract is done by awarding stocks to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011082482