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Dynamic Adverse Selection and Debt

Faure-Grimaud, Antoine; Chemla, Gilles - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708865

Cognitive and behavioral bias of CEOs in the merger and acquisition process: an overview of existing theory

Barabel, Michel - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861636

Merger paradox : the strategic role of minority in integration process

Meier, Olivier; Barabel, Michel - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2006

This article examines the link between the integration processes at work in acquired companies and the results of acquisition. New questions are raised concerning the underlying mechanisms of the integration process, in which it is essential to identify those factors that lend value to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905268

Rendre compte de la rémunération des dirigeants : qu’attendre du say on pay ?

Belot, François; Ginglinger, Edith - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2013

The AFEP-MEDEF corporate governance code amended in 2013 introduces the say on pay principle, which grants shareholders the right to vote on executive remuneration at annual general meetings. This paper aims at reviewing the studies undertaken in countries that have established this principle...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010757434

Freedom of Choice between Unitary and Two-Tier Boards: An Empirical Analysis

Belot, François; Ginglinger, Edith; Slovin, Myron B.; … - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2014

We examine board structure in France, which since 1966 has allowed firms freedom to choose between unitary and two-tier boards. We analyze how this choice relates to characteristics of the firm and its environment. Firms with severe asymmetric information tend to opt for unitary boards; firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010783759

Do target shareholder agreements induce bidders to pay higher premiums?

Belot, François - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2009

takeovers. Using a sample of French deals, this paper investigates the impact of shareholder agreements on takeover premiums. A … shareholder agreement is in force in 27.1% of target companies. A positive relationship between shareholder pacts and takeover …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706570

Ownership, control and market liquidity

Hamon, Jacques; Ginglinger, Edith - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)

We examine how ownership concentration and the separation of ownership and control affect market liquidity in France. We find that firms with a large insider blockholder exhibit significantly lower liquidity. Different methods of concentrating control affect liquidity in different ways. Pyramid...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706821

Hold-Up, Stakeholders and Takeover Threats

Chemla, Gilles - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2005

We analyze the impact of takeover threats on long term relationships between the target owners and other stakeholders …’ incentive to invest. The threat of a takeover that would transfer value from the stakeholders reduces their ex ante investment …. However, the stakeholders may appropriate ex post some value created by a takeover. This can prevent some value …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010707320

Excess control rights and corporate acquisitions

Belot, François - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2010

The typical French listed company exhibits a concentrated ownership structure with the largest shareholder typically holding more voting rights than cash flow rights. This paper studies the acquisitions made by French listed firms over the period 2000 through 2009 and investigates how such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010707798

La répartition des droits de vote, leur exercice et l’efficacité économique

Hamon, Jacques - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2001

This paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems in Europe. One share-one vote encourages the selection of an efficient management team. Families are the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010707890