This paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems in Europe. One share-one vote encourages the selection of an efficient management team. Families are the...

Including real options in firms ’ value raises numerous difficulties. Limitations concerning the relevance of option pricing models outside financial markets are the most salient, but carrying out a valuation implies other assumptions, especially on firms’ governance. In particular,...

Despite a large body of literature on the topic and the continuously improving understanding of professionals, real options are not widely used to value firms. Numerous assumptions have been raised to explain the various obstacles to their adoption. Limits concerning the relevance of option...

Dans cet article, nous considérons une relation bilatérale entre un décideur et un expert dans laquelle l’expert observe de manière privée un paramètre représentant un état de la nature. L’expert possède un biais décisionnel qui le conduit à toujours préférer une décision...

A principal needs a worker for the production of a good. The worker can be hired as an internal agent, or an external agent under a contract. These two organizational modes correspond to in-house production and outsourcing, respectively. In each case, the agent earns experience benefits: future...

One of the central questions in corporate finance is whether investors prefer to receive their payouts from corporations in the form of cash dividends or as capital gains. We know that most firms pay dividends, even though doing so is costly in various ways. And we know that the market reaction...

The motivation of this paper comes from repeated games with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. It concerns the existence, for any payoff function, of a particular equilibrium (called completely revealing) allowing each player to learn the state of nature. We consider thus an...

We study a class of symmetric strategic experimentation games. Each of two players faces an (exponential) two-armed bandit problem, and must decide when to stop experimenting with the risky arm. The equilibrium amount of experimentation depends on the degree to which experimentation outcomes are...