We study information transmission between informed experts and an uninformed decision-maker who only takes binary … decisions. In the single expert case, we show that information transmission can only be relatively poor. Hence, even sophiscated … communication games do not yield equilibria which (ex ante) outperform delegation. Referring to multiple experts allow the decision …

The motivation of this paper comes from repeated games with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. It … to learn the state of nature. We consider thus an interaction in which players, facing some incomplete information about …

We survey selected results on strategic information transmission. We distinguish between "cheap talk" and "persuasion …

expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium characterization is provided for unilateral persuasion games, and … to all equilibria of the unilateral persuasion game by delaying information certification. …

in which some information can be certified or, equivalently, in which players’ types are partially verifiable …. Certifiability of information is formalized by a set of available reports for each player that varies with the true state of the … special cases when no information can be certified. …

incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of …

information. We associate a strategic market gameΓ(E) withE. We prove that the allocations achieved through a self …

Conflicts of interest are the inherent price to pay to benefit from information synergies offered by multiple financial …