We develop a dynamic model in which traders have differential information about the payoff of the risky asset and trade the risky asset with proportional transaction costs. Firstly, trading volume provides useful information on the asset fundamental value which cannot be inferred from the...

The motivation of this paper comes from repeated games with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. It concerns the existence, for any payoff function, of a particular equilibrium (called completely revealing) allowing each player to learn the state of nature. We consider thus an...

We study a class of symmetric strategic experimentation games. Each of two players faces an (exponential) two-armed bandit problem, and must decide when to stop experimenting with the risky arm. The equilibrium amount of experimentation depends on the degree to which experimentation outcomes are...

We study information transmission between informed experts and an uninformed decision-maker who only takes binary decisions. In the single expert case, we show that information transmission can only be relatively poor. Hence, even sophiscated communication games do not yield equilibria which (ex...

We consider an equilibrium model á la Kyle-Back for a defaultable claim issued by a given firm. In such a market the insider observes \emph{continuously in time} the value of firm, which is unobservable by the market maker. Using the construction of a dynamic Bessel bridge of dimension $3$ in...

This paper is a generalization of [Calvet, L., Grandmont, J.-M., Lemaire, I., 2002. Aggregation of heterogenous beliefs and asset pricing in complete financial markets. Working paper] to a dynamic setting. We propose a method to aggregate heterogeneous individual probability beliefs, in dynamic...

The aim of the paper is to analyze the impact of heterogeneous beliefs in an otherwise standard competitive complete market economy. The construction of a consensus probability belief, as well as a consensus consumer, are shown to be valid modulo an aggregation bias, which takes the form of a...

The cost of equity capital is traditionally considered as an increasing function of the estimation risk – the risk of error regarding the distribution of a firm’s future cash flows (FCF). Under international GAAPs, IAS 36 “Impairment of assets” -based information disclosure conveys...