In the theoretical framework of corporate governance this article studies the efficiency of the control exerted by the ownership structure and the board of directors on managers. The confrontation of entrenchment theory and agency theory allows to determine the necessary conditions of the...

Controlled firms are in a framework where private benefits create a buffer between public earnings and economic profitability. We focus on debt leverage in the type II agency conflict between the controlling shareholder and outside investors. We use a simple discrete model comparing the capital...

Having been introduced in the European Union and in many other countries, the equal opportunity rule is seen as protecting investors in the event of a transfer of control. This rule should be analyzed in a context of appropriation of private benefits between the new controlling shareholders and...

Cet article s'inscrit dans le prolongement des travaux concernant l'évaluation des sociétés et de la dette par la théorie des options. Dans un premier temps, nous rappelons les principaux résultats concernant la lecture optionnelle du bilan. Dans un deuxième temps, nous introduisons les...

We interpret privatization in light of corporate governance theory. After replicating some traditional tests, we test our new model on a sample of privatized French firms. We cannot confirm for French privatizations the positive effect on overall static and dynamic efficiency of the firm...