The fundamentals of an exchange economy, the preferences of individuals, can be identified from the competitive equilibrium correspondence, which associates equilibrium prices of commodities to allocations of endowments; the argument extends to production economies. The essential step is the...

The main thrust of the paper is the design and the numerical analysis of new cap- and-trade schemes for the control and the reduction of atmospheric pollution. The tools developed are intended to help policy makers and regulators understand the pros and the cons of the emissions markets. We...

In this article, we extend Brouwer's fixed point theorem – which states that every continuous mapping f :B→B (a closed ball of Rn ) must have a fixed point – by allowing discontinuities of f, and we apply this extension to equilibrium theory in Economics.

The starting point of this paper is given by country situations where trade liberalization is expected to be poverty and inequality alleviating in the long run while inducing a short run increase in poverty or in inequality. The question we ask is what are the distributive aspects of trade which...

The article analyzes the Dynkin (1975) stochastic model of economic equilibrium. We solve a question regarding this model that was open for a long time. We provide arguments yielding a complete proof of Dynkin's existence theorem for equilibrium paths.

This paper provides evidence for the assertion that there is deep structural coherence between the work of Adam Smith and modern general equilibrium theory, most notably Gérard Debreu's Theory of Value. In particular, we show that Adam Smith formulated a number of highly original and to some...

We develop a theory of decision making and General Equilibrium for contingent markets when incomplete preferences are generated by second-order stochastic dominance (SSD). Demand, Pareto-optima and equilibria dominance are fully characterized. Demands and equilibrium allocations are...

We study the existence of uniform equilibria for three-player repeated games with lack of information on one side and perfect observation. If there are only two states of nature, a completely revealing or a joint plan equilibrium always exists. This is not the case for larger spaces of states.