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In this paper, we develop a dynamic model that captures the interaction between a firm’s cash reserves, the risk management policy and the profitability of a non-predictable irreversible investment opportunity. We consider a firm that has assets in place generating a stochastic cash-flow...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011082467
In the theoretical framework of corporate governance this article studies the efficiency of the control exerted by the ownership structure and the board of directors on managers. The confrontation of entrenchment theory and agency theory allows to determine the necessary conditions of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861596
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905148
We examine board structure in France, which since 1966 has allowed firms freedom to choose between unitary and two-tier boards. We analyze how this choice relates to characteristics of the firm and its environment. Firms with severe asymmetric information tend to opt for unitary boards; firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010783759
The analyses of the tender offer premiums and of the means of payment should not be performed separately. In the empirical literature, these two variables are often considered independently, although they may have an endogenous relationship in a contractual setting. Using a sample of European...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010735772
This paper examines the impact of market liquidity on seasoned equity offerings (SEO) characteristics in France. We find that, besides blockholders’ takeup, liquidity is an important determinant of SEO flotation method choice. We document higher direct equity offering flotation costs, but also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744752
Debt is not frequently analyzed in relation to the conflict between controlling and outside shareholders. At the same time, debt helps to manage the type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010790025
Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It supports an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010790035
In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their relations. Such agreements are often viewed as means of insulating the firm from the market for corporate control. Specific provisions (namely concerted action, pre-emptive buying rights and repartitioning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706570
We examine how ownership concentration and the separation of ownership and control affect market liquidity in France. We find that firms with a large insider blockholder exhibit significantly lower liquidity. Different methods of concentrating control affect liquidity in different ways. Pyramid...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706821