Private insurance for long-term care is underdeveloped in European countries and in the US. This paper tries to understand why the market is underdevelopped by using a theoretical approach and putting the emphasis on insurance demand. It shows that demand for long term care insurance can be low...

The present paper thoroughly explores second-best efficient allocations in an insurance economy with adverse selection. We start with a natural extension of the classical model, assuming less than perfect risk perception. We characterize the constraints on efficient redistribution, and we...

We consider a formal approach to comparative risk aversion and apply it to intertemporal choice models. This makes it possible to investigate whether standard classes of utility functions, such as those inspired from Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), Selden (1978), Epstein and Zin (1989) or Quiggin...

We study an economywhere intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. In this context, we show that, contrarily to what is commonly believed, market equilibria may fail to be efficient even if the planner is not allowed to enforce...