This paper studies investments in new markets where more than two (anticipated) identical competitors are present. In case of three firms an accordion effect is detected: an exogenous demand shock results in a change of the wedge between investment thresholds of the first and second investor...

This note establishes that in every 3-3 symmetric game, the replicator dynamics eliminates all strategies that are never used in correlated equilibrium. This extends to the best-response dynamics and to any convex monotonic dynamics. The proof is based on dual reduction.

This paper presents recent results from Mean Field Game theory underlying the introduction of common noise that imposes to incorporate the distribution of the agents as a state variable. Starting from the usual mean field games equations introduced in [11 , 12 , 13 ] and adapting them to games...

Afriat proved the equivalence of a variant of the strong axiom of revealed preference and the existence of a solution to a set of linear inequalities. From this solution he constructed a utility function rationalizing the choices of a competitive consumer. We extend Afriat's theorem to a class...

We study dual reduction: a technique to reduce finite games in a way that selects among correlated equilibria. We show that the reduction process is independent of the utility functions chosen to represent the agents's preferences and that generic two-player games have a unique full dual...

Using an explicit representation in terms of the logit map we show, in a unilateral framework, that the time average of the replicator dynamics is a perturbed solution of the best reply dynamics.

This article is focused on children providing and financing long-term care for their elderly parent. The aim of this work is to highlight the interactions that may take place among siblings when deciding whether or not to become a caregiver. We look at families with two children using data from...

This article studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponents'. We chararacterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an exploration phase is followed...