We characterize the competitive equilibrium on the credit market when borrowers can strategically default. We assume that the audit is subject of errors of the two types and that lenders cannot commit ex-ante. We determine the penalty, the loan rate, the audit and strategic default...

We examine the empirical relationship between immigration and crime across Italian provinces during the period 1990-2003. Drawing on police administrative records, we first document that the size of the immigrant population is positively correlated with the incidence of property crimes and with...

Antitrust authorities have set up leniency programs for cartel members that denounce their collusive agreements. These programs help prosecute participants and can thereby deter collusion. We compare the impact of reduced fines and positive rewards and argue that rewarding individuals, including...

This paper proposes to show how the work of Norbert Alter brings a major contribution to our understanding of organizations, specially regarding intimately intricate phenomena such as innovation and rule transgression. This French sociologist clearly pinpoints the existence, forms and stakes of...

Role, missions, choice, training, know-how, responsibilities, in financial forensic matters in Europe

In this paper, we examine the issue of how certain actors tend to maintain institutionalized elements, in spite of significant technological and social change. In particular, we focus on the notion of artifacts, which represent one type of institutional carriers, but mostly overlooked in the...

This paper argues that random audit programs provide income taxpayers with information that alters their perceptions of, and hence their behavioral responses to, audits. Comparing samples of randomly selected audited and non-audited UK taxpayers, the evidence confirms predictions that audited...