We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.

In a commonvalueauction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy et al. [Einy, E., Haimanko, O., Orzach, R., Sela, A.,...

We consider an auction setting, in a symmetric information framework, in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We prove that the outcome of the first-price auction is not affected by identity-independent price externalities, while the...

The pre-liberalized sector provided electricity consumers with a supply at regulated prices. With the liberalization movement, consumers are now faced with a new price risk. The purpose of this paper is to review, firstly the price policy conducted in France since the fifties, and secondly to...

The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has imposed a price on the allowances for CO2 emissions of electricity companies. Integrating this allowance price into the price of electricity earns a rent for companies who have received these allowances for free. During Phase I,...

Interconnecting two adjacent areas of electricity production generates benefits in combined consumer surplus and welfare by allowing electricity to flow from the low cost area to the high cost area. It will lower prices in the high cost area, raise them in the low cost area and will thus have...

With the introduction of CO2 allowances, the European Union Carbon Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has imposed a price on the CO2 emissions of power generating companies. In line with economic theory, these companies pass on the costs of allowances and integrate it into the price of electricity. Due to...