This paper analyses the private equity fund compensation. We build a model to estimate the expected revenue of fund managers as a function of their investor contracts. We tried to evaluate the present value of the carried interest, which is one of the most common profit sharing arrangements...

Attracting long-term investors from the private sector or in public-private partnerships for stable long-term investment in the innovative sectors and industries needed to generate sustained growth is crucial. Long-term investors want assets that generate regular cash flows, often linked to...

Building on Smith (1989), we describe the social processes surrounding a new financial OTC derivatives market, the market for credit derivatives. We show that in contradiction to more traditional derivatives, credit derivatives generate ambiguities of a cognitive and political nature. By...

This paper first presents the workings (institutions, claims, issuance procedures and calendar) of the primary market for Treasury Bills within the Eurozone and in the U.K. Then, it describes the secondary market, and focuses on electronic platforms. Finally, it compares the efficiency of...

Because of their governance, investors are not able to develop long-term investment policies. While they have been outsourcing investment decision making to asset management firms and evaluation to intermediaries (consulting firms and credit rating agencies), they have contributed to the...

Because of their governance, investors are not able to develop long-term investment policies. While they have been outsourcing investment decision making to asset management firms and evaluation to intermediaries (consulting firms and credit rating agencies), they have contributed to the...

In Madagascar, Orange introduced its mobile banking services in September 2010. Mobile-banking (m-banking) is a system that allows users to conduct a number of financial transactions through a mobile phone. The existing body of literature suggests that the use of m-banking services may have a...

We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can...