Debt is not frequently analyzed in relation to the conflict between controlling and outside shareholders. At the same … time, debt helps to manage the type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to …

Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify … period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It supports an inverted U-shape relationship between shareholders' ownership and … leverage. At low levels of ownership, controlling shareholders use more debt in order to inflate their stake in capital and to …

In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their relations. Such agreements … takeovers. Using a sample of French deals, this paper investigates the impact of shareholder agreements on takeover premiums. A … shareholder agreement is in force in 27.1% of target companies. A positive relationship between shareholder pacts and takeover …

conflict between outside and controlling shareholders. It may self-regulate the two parties involved in a control contract. The …

of an efficient management team. Families are the most pronounced type of controlling shareholders in Europe, especially … minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders is extensive. The efficiency of capital allocation is positively …

Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify … period 1998–2009 is empirically tested. It supports an inverted U-shape relationship between shareholders’ ownership and … leverage. At low levels of ownership, controlling shareholders use more debt in order to inflate their stake in capital and to …

shareholders, and run counter to the thesis of convergence to the Anglo-American standard of unitary board structure. …