By introducing a structure of the balance sheets of the banks, which takes into account their bilateral exposures in terms of stocks or lendings, we get a structural model for default analysis. This model allows us to distinguish the exogenous and endogenous default dependence. We prove the...

Dans ce papier, nous avons analysé les liens possibles entre les indicateurs de supervision, de réglementation et les crises bancaires, nous avons construit alors différents indicateurs de supervision, de réglementation pour 40 pays développés et émergents. Nous avons appliqué un modèle...

This paper analyzes how bankruptcy litigation affects the value of relationship banking. In our model, bankruptcy courts may make type 1 errors, i.e., they may declare that an insolvent firm is solvent; and they may make type 2 errors, i.e., they may declare that a solvent firm is insolvent. Our...

The organization of securities markets has not benefited from the feigned attempts of reform presented by authorities since the outbreak of the current crisis. However, speculative opportunities like the risks incurred also depend on the markets on which one operates. The Markets in Financial...

L'article présente le document publié par le Comité de Bâle, redéfinissant le champ de la fonction "compliance".

The post-crisis financial reforms address the need for systemic regulation, focused not only on individual banks but also on the whole financial system. The regulator principal objective is to set banks' capital requirements equal to international minimum standards in order to mimimise systemic...

Today, the main problem in financing economies is linked to liquidity problems of banks. The paradox is that the world has never had so many liquidities at its disposal and rarely has economic players found themselves under such obligations. Economic stimulus goes through this mobilisation of...

The post-crisis financial reforms address the need for systemic regulation, focused not only on individual banks but also on the whole financial system. The regulator principal objective is to set banks' capital requirements equal to international minimum standards in order to mimimise systemic...

In this paper, we take up the analysis of a principal/agent model with moral hazard introduced by Pagès (J. Financ. Intermed. doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2012.06.001, 2012), with optimal contracting between competitive investors and an impatient bank monitoring a pool of long-term loans subject to...