We introduce differential information in the asset market model studied by Cheng (1991), Dana and Le Van (1996) and Le Van and Truong Xuan (2001). An equilibrium existence result is proven assuming that the economy's information structure satisfies the conditional independency property. If...

In this article, we present a reference case of mean field games. This case can be seen as a reference for two main reasons. First, the case is simple enough to allow for explicit resolution: Bellman functions are quadratic, stationary measures are normal and stability can be dealt with...

We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff vectors satisfying this condition. The additional...

We consider exchange economies with a measure space of agents and for which the commodity space is a separable and reflexive Banach lattice. Under assumptions imposing uniform bounds on marginal rates of substitution, positive results on core-Walras equivalence were established in...

In this paper we prove the existence of general equilibrium with transaction costs generalizing Hahn's (Review of Economic Studies, 1973, 40, 449-461) model by introducing producers and nonconvexities (in particular we allow for increasing returns in transaction sets). We also recover any...

This paper shows topological properties of the graph of the Walras correspondence such as connectedness and simple connectedness for economies with production.

We consider a general equilibrium model in which the production sector may exhibit increasing returns to scale or more general types of nonconvexities. We assume that the firms follow general pricing rules. Under standard assumptions in this model, we establish an index formula, which...

This is a brief survey describing some of the recent progress and open problems in the area of cooperative games with incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of cooperation in non-cooperative Bayesian games.

We study incentive-compatible labor contracts in the case where both individual productivity and subjective discount rate are unobservable by the rm. We rst show that unidimensional manifolds of agents group on the same contract. High , low agents may choose the same contract as low , high...