This paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems in Europe. One share-one vote encourages the selection of an efficient management team. Families are the...

This chapter summarizes recent research on the role of law, culture and corruption on venture capital (VC) fund structure, governance and performance. Evidence from studies that involve a multitude of countries is primarily considered. The evidence across most studies is broadly consistent with...

In the theoretical framework of corporate governance this article studies the efficiency of the control exerted by the ownership structure and the board of directors on managers. The confrontation of entrenchment theory and agency theory allows to determine the necessary conditions of the...

Profit manipulation has been largely studied through Positive Accounting Theory (PAT). However, the weakness of the results obtained would suggest using different theoretical and methodological approaches to examine this subject. In France, management controllers play a central role in profit...

Including real options in firms ’ value raises numerous difficulties. Limitations concerning the relevance of option pricing models outside financial markets are the most salient, but carrying out a valuation implies other assumptions, especially on firms’ governance. In particular,...

This paper aims to examine the effect of many ownership features on firm's disclosure quality using the theoretical framework of the agency theory, which states that investors information demand increases with agency costs of the firm. Public ownership increases agency costs and therefore should...

Debt is not frequently analyzed in relation to the conflict between controlling and outside shareholders. At the same time, debt helps to manage the type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of...

Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It supports an...

This paper analyses the private equity fund compensation. We build a model to estimate the expected revenue of fund managers as a function of their investor contracts. We tried to evaluate the present value of the carried interest, which is one of the most common profit sharing arrangements...