Suppes-Sen Dominance is a commonly accepted criterion of impartiality in distributive justice. Mariotti (1999) characterized the Nash bargaining solution using Nash (1950).s Scale Invariance (SI) axiom and an axiom named Suppes-Sen Proofness (SSP) that embodies the Suppes-Sen principle. By...

We propose a new axiom, Weakest Collective Rationality (WCR) which is weaker than both Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO) in Nash (1950)’s original characterization and Strong Individual Rationality (SIR) in Roth (1977)’s characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. We then characterize the...

Most real-life bargaining is resolved gradually; two parties reach intermediate agreements without knowing the whole range of possibilities. These intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds. Cooperative bargaining solutions ignore these dynamics and can therefore...

This article proposes a simple Nash program. Both our axiomatic characterization and our noncooperative procedure consider each distinct asymmetric and symmetric Nash solution. Our noncooperative procedure is a generalization of the simplest known sequential Nash demand game analyzed by...

Most real-life bargaining is resolved gradually. During this process parties reach intermediate agreements. These intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds. We identify robustness criteria which are satisfied by three prominent bargaining solutions, the Nash,...

In the current FIFA penalty shootout mechanism, a coin toss decides which team will kick first. Empirical evidence suggests that the team taking the first kick has a higher probability to win a shootout. We design sequentially fair shootout mechanisms such that in all symmetric Markov-perfect...

Laffont and Tirole (1988) show that when the uncertainty about the agent's ability is small, the equilibrium must involve a large amount of pooling, but whether the continuation equilibrium induced by a optimal first-period menu of contracts is partition or not remains unclear. They construct a...

A new, more fundamental approach is proposed to the classical bargaining problem. The give-and-take feature in the negotiation process is explicitly modelled under the new framework. A compromise set consists of all allocations a bargainer is willing to accept as agreement. We focus on the...

We investigate the support for extreme right across societies of different levels of openness in Europe. Societal openness is defined as a greater tendency to accept universal vis-à-vis traditional values, and is expected to catalyze and filter the socioeconomic factors that affect the vote...

Previous research has shown that individuals do not respond to changes in their bargaining position to the extent predicted by standard bargaining theories. Most of these results come from experiments with bargaining power allocated exogenously, so that individuals may perceive it as having been...