We study decentralized learning dynamics for the classic assignment game with transferable utility.  At random points in time firms and workers match, break up, and re-match in the sesarch for better opportunities.  We propose a simple learning process in which players have no knowledge about...

We study evolutionary dynamics in assignment games where many agents interact anonymously at virtually no cost.  The process is decentralized, very little information is available and trade takes place at many different prices simultaneously.  We propose a completely uncoupled learning process...

The World's nations have yet to reach a truly effective treaty to control the emission of greenhouse gases.  The importance of compatibility with private incentives of individual countries has been acknowledged (at least by game theorists) in designing climate policies for the post-Kyoto...

A large literature describes how local risk sharing networks can help individuals smooth consumption in the face of idiosyncratic economic shocks.  However, when an entire community faces a large covariate shock, and when the transaction costs of transfers are high, these risk sharing networks...

Using data from the Philippines, this paper seeks to understand how households in the study area apparently manage to avoid falling in a debt trap in spite of frequent borrowing. Findings suggest this is achieved via three institutional features. First, most informal debt carries no interest. As...

Exploiting new data from a survey and behavioral experiment conducted in Peru we analyze indvidual`s preferences for securing income in old age. We identify a group that is unrationed by the mandate to save in Peru`s pension system, and draw insights from their affiliation and contribution...

We provide a model of coalitional bargaining with claims in order to solve games with non-transferable utilities and externalities.  We show that, for each such game, payoff configurations exist which will not be renegoiated.  In the original game derived from these payoff configurations, we...

We propose a new, easy-to-implement, class of payment rules, "Reference Rules", to make core-selecting package auctions more robust.  Small, almost-riskless, profitable deviations from "truthful bidding" are often easy for bidders to find under currently-used payment rules.  Reference Rules...

We generalize the class of apex game by combining a winning coalition of symmetric minor players with a collection of apex sets which can form winning coalitions only together with a fixed quota of minor players.  By applying power indices to these games and their subgames we generate players'...

This note introduces transferable utility cooperative games with multiple membership, extending the scope of cooperative game theory to economic environments featuring externalities and membership in multiple coalitions.  This wider class of games generalises games in characteristic and...