This paper studies games in which the players are not locked into their relationship for a fixed number of periods. We consider two-player games where player 1 can decide to let the opponent continue in the game or replace it with a new player. We also allow the possibility of player 2 quitting...

The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games offers an embarrassment of riches; nowhere is equilibrium multiplicity more acute. This paper selects amongst these equilibria in the following sense. If players learn to play an infinitely repeated game using classical hypothesis testing, it is...

We study in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in a multiplayer dictator game.  An allocator divides a large sum of money among three groups of 20 recipients each and Self.  Allocations to groups are divided equally among the group members.  The three groups are supporters of the...

History offers many examples of dictators who worsened their behavior significantly over time (like Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe), while there are also cases of dictators who have displayed remarkable improvements (like Jerry Rawlings of Ghana).  We show that such mutations can result from rational...

Following the wave of democratization during the 1990s, elections are now common in low-income societies.  However, these elections are frequently flawed.  We investigate the Nigerian general election of 2007, which is to date the largest election held in Africa and one seriously marred by...

A new game theoretic analysis of finite horizon, complete information bargaining is advanced. The extensive form reflects an attempt to model unstructured negotiations, in which the negotiants can gain no artificial advantage from the details of the bargaining protocol. Conditions are identified...

We investigate the causes of civil war, using a new data set of wars during 1960-99. We test a greed theory focusing on the ability to finance rebellion, against a grievance theory focusing on ethnic and religious divisions, political repression and inequality. We find that greed considerably...

We model the choice of leaders of groups within society, where leaders influence both the mode of interaction between groups (either peaceful compromise or costly conflict) and the outcome of these interactions. Group members may choose leaders strategically/instrumentally or they may choose...

In an asymmetric war of attrition the players` prize valuations are drawn from different distributions. A stochastic strength ordering, based upon relative hazard rates, is used to rank these distributions. The stochastically stronger player is perceived to be strong ex ante, even though her...

This paper defines regular and weakly regular equilibria for monotone Bayesian games with one-dimensional actions and types.  It proves an index theorem and provides applications to uniqueness of equilibrium.  It also provides analyses of stability with respect to perturbations and dynamic...