We present a comprehensive theory of large non-anonymous games in which agents have a name and a determinate social-type and/or biological trait to resolve the dissonance of a (matching-pennies type) game with an exact pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with finite agents, but without one when...

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We present results on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilbria in nonatomic games We also show by means of counterexamples that the stringent conditions on the cardinality of actions sets cannot be relaxed and thus resolve questions which have remained open since Schmeidler's 1973 paper

We show that the main theorem in Al-Najjar's 1995 Econometrica paper is false We provide additional references for the residual implications that are valid but point our that these standard implications are incapable of bearing the interpretative weight that Al-Najjar places on them

In the setting of non-cooperative game theory strategic negligibility of individual agents or diffuseness of information has been modelled as a non-atomic measure space typically the unit interval endowed with Lebesgue measure However recent work has shown that with uncountable action sets as...

We provide a detailed portfolio analysis for a financial market with an atomless continuum of assets. In the context of an exact arbitrage pricing theory (EAPT), we go beyond the characterization of the existence of important portfolios (normalized riskless, mean, cost, factor and mean-variance...

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