We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the "winner’s curse" arises only in common values auctions. The tests build on recently developed...

In this note we propose model selection criteria (MSC) for unconditional moment models using empirical likelihood (EL) statistics in the construction of the MSC The use of EL-statistics in lieu of the more common J-statistics leads to a much more transparent interpretation of the MSC by...

We develop a new estimation methodology for dynamic optimization models with unobserved state variables Our approach is semiparametric in the sense of not requiring explicit parametric assumptions to be made concerning the distribution of these unobserved state variables We propose a two-step...

We empirically measure the effects of increasing competition on equilibrium bidding in procurement auctions In common-value auctions the winner's curse counsels more conservative bidding as the number of competitors increases First we estimate the structural parameters of an equilibrium bidding...

We develop econometric models of ascending (English) auctions which allow for both bidder asymmetries as well as common and/or private value components in bidders' underlying valuations We show that the equilibrium inverse bid functions in each round of the auction are implicitly defined...